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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Allen Gillespie contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction, or alternatively, when it failed to reduce his sentence sua
sponte pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). Additionally, he contends that the

waiver of his appellate rights does not extend to challenges to the decision to relinquish
jurisdiction. The reasonable inference from the record is that Mr. Gillespie only intended
the waiver to extend to his ability to challenge the initial imposition of sentence, but not
to extend to his ability to contest the district court's decisions at the end of his period of
retained jurisdiction.

The rule of lenity requires such situations to resolve in the

defendant's favor because the focus of such review is on what enticed the defendant to
plead guilty. The State's responses regarding the waiver are unconvincing and its
arguments regarding the merits of Mr. Gillespie's claims are not remarkable. As such,
this Court should not only reach the merits of Mr. Gillespie's claims, but also grant him
relief in light of the abuse of the district court's discretion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Gillespie's Appellant's Brief. With one exception for clarification, they need not be
repeated in this Reply Brief. The statement of facts and course of proceedings from the
Appellant's Brief are otherwise incorporated herein by reference thereto.
The point of clarification addresses Mr. Gillespie's prior periods of probation.
While he had been on probation before, the record indicates he has completed all those
prior periods of probation.

(See Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),

1

pp.10-12 (indicating the most recent probationary periods were completed on July 5,
2009 and March 30 2011. 1))
1

1

The instant offense occurred on March 4, 2011. (PSI, pp.11-12; R., pp.41-45.)
2

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over
Mr. Gillespie, or alternatively, by not reducing his sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule
35 when it did so.

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Gillespie, Or Alternatively, By Not Reducing His Sentence Sua Sponte
Pursuant To Rule 35 When It Did So

A.

Introduction
The appellate waiver included in the plea agreement in this case is not as broad

as the State contends; it only extended to Mr. Gillespie's ability to challenge the
imposition of sentence, not the district court's subsequent and distinct decision to
relinquish jurisdiction.

In this case, Mr. Gillespie was specifically negotiating for the

opportunity to participate in the rider program, so as to earn probationary release.
Given that reasonable understanding of the ambiguous terms of the plea agreement,
the rule of lenity requires the agreement to be construed in Mr. Gillespie's favor
because it is the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement which
controls. As such, this Court has the authority to consider the merits of Mr. Gillespie's
claims. A review of the merits of those claims should result in relief because the district
court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Gillespie.

B.

The Waiver Of Appellate Relief Included In The I.C.R. 11 Plea Agreement Does
Not Extend To An Appeal From The Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined a waiver as "a voluntary relinquishment of

a know right or advantage" and part of that definition is that there is a presumption
against such waivers.

Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834 n.11 (2008). Additionally,

"[t]he state has a heavy burden" to overcome that presumption. State v. Mitchell, 104
Idaho 493, 497 (1983). In other words, when the scope of a term in a plea agreement is
in question, the courts focus "on the defendant's reasonable understanding ... on
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what induced the defendant to plead guilty."

State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 496

(Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595 (2010) (in turn quoting

United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993))) (emphasis from
Nienburg), reh'g denied.

Given that premise, the State has failed to overcome that

heavy burden and demonstrate that Mr. Gillespie intended to waive any appellate rights
beyond his right to challenge the imposition of sentence.
The reason that the waiver in this case cannot be read as broadly as the State
contends is that the decision to relinquish jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the
decision to impose sentence, so much so that it may be appealed separately as a
matter of right in Idaho.

Compare State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001)

(holding that the sentence may only be imposed at the sentencing hearing) with State v.

Roberts, 126 Idaho 920, 922 (1995) (holding that the order relinquishing jurisdiction is
separate from both the decision to impose a sentence and to grant relief pursuant to
Rule 35, and from which a distinct and timely notice of appeal must be filed); see also
I.C. § 19-2801 (establishing the right to appeal various orders and judgments in a
criminal action "in such a manner as prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court");
I.AR. 11 (c)(9) (addressing which orders by a district court are appealable as a matter of
right).

Because the decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a separately appealable

decision by the district court, a waiver of the right to appeal the order imposing sentence
cannot also be inferred to waive the right to appeal a separate decision.

See, e.g.,

Smith, 146 Idaho at 834 n.11; Mitchell, 104 Idaho at 497.
Furthermore, in this particular case, it is evident that Mr. Gillespie was specifically
bargaining for the rider opportunity so as to earn probationary release, and as such,
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was not waiving the right to challenge the district court's decision to deny him that
release: ''I [the prosecutor] think what's contemplated, Your Honor, is he would enter
the plea today with those charges as indicated. He is to be released OR with certain
parameters.

We would get the PSI and come back for sentencing.

anticipated is that we would have the CAPP program.

/ think what's

(Tr., Vol.1, p.2, Ls.6-11

(emphasis added); see also R., p.19 (the binding plea agreement specifically requiring
the district court to not only retain jurisdiction, but to also recommend Mr. Gillespie's
participation in the CAPP program).)

Additionally, the district court pointed out at

sentencing:
I think the reason he's probably pursued this Rule 11 agreement, he
knows that you would be at risk for getting a stiffer penalty from me. I
don't think this is really unfair in the case, but I can see how he arrived at
this, because he knows how I treat DUI cases and felony DUI cases.
Having said that, the CAPP program has impressed me ....
(Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.24

p.12, L.5.) The district court actually recognized on the record

that Mr. Gillespie's intent with his plea agreement was to ensure he received a very
particular sentence with a specific recommendation for a period of retained jurisdiction
in the CAPP program. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.24

p.12, L.5.)

Furthermore, the agreement is clear that "[i]f the Defendant successfully
completes the retained jurisdiction, the court shall suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the Defendant on probation for a period of four (4) years."
(R., p.19.)

The reasonable inference from all these terms is that Mr. Gillespie was

negotiating to ensure he received treatment in the CAPP program and then be released
on probation thereafter, it is axiomatic that Mr. Gillespie would preserve the right to
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challenge a decision from the district court that undermined his goals. 2 The rule of
lenity requires that such ambiguities in plea agreements be resolved in the defendant's
favor. State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595 (2010); see also Hughey v. United States,
495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (declaring that the rule of lenity requires ambiguous
agreements to be resolved in favor of the defendant, regardless of policy and legislative
history).

The reason is that the defendant's understanding of the terms of his

agreement controls because he is the one giving up his rights as a result of the
agreement.

Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 496.

As such, the provision that he waive his

appellate rights should not be seen to extend to the separate determination regarding
the decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
In fact, when the Department of Correction made a decision which undermined
the plea, as Mr. Gillespie understood it, he took action to challenge that decision.
(See, e.g., R., p.53 (basing a motion for Rule 35 relief explicitly "on the refusal of the
Board of Corrections [sic] to place the Defendant in the CAPP program that was a

significant component of the Rule 11 plea agreement.") (emphasis added).) Therefore,
the record is clear that he did not understand his waiver of appellate and Rule 35 relief

(see R., p.19) to extend to decisions beyond the imposition of the sentence and which
undermined the purpose of his plea. That understanding controls, regardless of how
reasonable the State's alternative explanation may be. 3 Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 496. A

2

This interpretation, as opposed to the State's (see Resp. Br., pp.5-8), does not clash
with the rule then contained in I.C.R. 11(d)(1) (now 11(f)(1)), which contemplates that
such waivers extend to the judgment of the court and sentence imposed therein. See
Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457.
3
IV1r. Gillespie does not concede that the State's alternative is reasonable, given the
record in this case. He clearly did not intend to waive his right to challenge decisions
which deprived him of participation in the CAPP program or to not place him on
7

second, reasonable interpretation would only create an ambiguity as to the scope of that
term of the plea agreement, and such ambiguities are resolved in the defendant's favor.
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595; see also Hughey, 495 U.S. at 422.

Therefore, because the record reveals that Mr. Gillespie did not intend for the
appellate waiver in his plea agreement to extend to the subsequent, separate decision
of whether or not to relinquish jurisdiction, he is able to challenge the district court's
decisions in that regard.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Its Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Gillespie Without Sufficiently Considering the Mitigating Factors In The
Record
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Gillespie mistakenly framed this argument, as well as

the argument in section D, in terms of revocation of probation. He apologizes for those
mischaracterizations. However, the analysis of the district court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction is essentially the same as that for the revocation of probation. (Compare
App. Br., pp.10-11.) The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.

State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App.

2011 ); State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ).

Such a decision will not

be considered an abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information
to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate."
State v. MetWin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). "The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after

imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the
defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho

probation thereafter, given the fact he did not get to participate in that program.
(See generally App. Br., pp.10-16.)
8

203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). In making that determination, the district court "considers all
of the circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured

environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes of
rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at
137. It is guided in this determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Metwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In
this regard, the need to protect society is the primary objective the court should
consider.
disposition

See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

that

protects

society and

also

accomplishes

the

As such, a

other objectives

(rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment) will be considered reasonable.

See id.

This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives,
and therefore, each must be addressed in the disposition. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho
at 500.
As such, the State's responses concerning the decision to relinquish jurisdiction
over Mr. Gillespie's, which argue under this framework, are not remarkable, and as
such, no further reply is necessary in regard to those issues. Accordingly, Mr. Gillespie
simply refers the Court back to pages 11-15 of his Appellant's Brief.

D.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing
Mr. Gillespie's Sentences Sua Sponte Pursuant To Rule 35 When It Revoked His
Probation
As with the argument in Section C, infra, the standard in this regard is essentially

the same between the revocation of probation and the relinquishment of jurisdiction.
(Compare App. Br. at 15-16.) After a defendant has completed a period of retained

jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the sentence, which results in the defendant
being placed on probation, or it can resume the execution of the underlying sentence.
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State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003).

If the district court decides to

resume the execution of the underlying sentence, it also has the authority to reduce the
sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Id.; see also State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho
779, 782 (2008) (applying the same rule to the decision to the similar situation of
probation revocation).
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion.

State v. Hanington,

148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among
others, Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently
consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the
record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should result in a
more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at
595.
In this regard, the State erroneously contends that such relief was unavailable at
the decision to relinquish jurisdiction because of the waiver. (See Resp. Br., p.8 n.3)
However, that was not the scope of that term of the plea agreement as Mr. Gillespie
understood it. ( See, e.g., R., p.53.) In fact, the State did not invoke the waiver below,
but instead objected on the merits of Mr. Gillespie's claims, further indicating that those
terms were not intended to extend beyond the initial imposition of sentence.

(See

R., pp.65-66.) Therefore, as discussed in section (B), infra, that waiver did not extend

to the decision to relinquish jurisdiction.

Regardless, the district court did have the
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authority to grant Rule 35 relief when it relinquished jurisdiction, regardless of whether
Mr. Gillespie waived his right to request such relief. Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264.
The State's remaining contentions regarding the merits of this particular
argument are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in that regard.
Accordingly, Mr. Gillespie simply refers the Court back to pages 15-16 of his Appellant's
Brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gillespie respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 26 th day of December, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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